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The judicial branch needs to take a more assertive role in maintaining the separation of 
powers within the federal government.  While historically hostile to the idea, the Supreme Court 
should liberalize congressional standing.  Congressional standing should be allowed for disputes 
involving both the interpretation of the Constitution and statutes.  By liberalizing congressional 
standing, the Court would create a system of checks and balances that is both normatively 
superior to the current system and more true to the Founding Fathers’ intent for the prevention of 
tyranny within the federal government.   
Introduction 
Imagine your favorite president being in office.  Your viewpoints closely align with this 
president’s, and you expect great things to happen with him in office.  The president was just 
reelected for his second term on the campaign slogan “[c]hange we can believe in,” but much to 
his, and your, chagrin, he has not been able to accomplish the very important things that he 
promised during his campaigns.  The cause behind this lack of change – Congress’s veritable 
blockade of the president’s agenda.  Even more frustrating is that the American citizens elected 
the president based on this agenda not just once, but twice.  Well the president, having made it 
this far in life, is no dummy, and as the head of the executive branch of government, he has at his 
disposal more than 2,000,000 employees,
1
 some of whom are the most intelligent advisors in the 
world.  With the help of these experts, the president formulates a plan where “he acts within his 
constitutionally granted powers,” and achieves the change that our country so desperately 
needed.  That is a win, right? 
                                                          
1
 U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Federal Employment Reports, Historical Federal Workforce Tables, Executive Branch 
Civilian Employment Since 1940, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-
employment-reports/historical-tables/executive-branch-civilian-employment-since-1940/. 
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Now imagine your least favorite person as president in the same scenario.  His 
shenanigans were always stopped by Congress before, but now, in his second term, after 
discussing the matter with his advisors, he uses his “executive power” to impose his will.  Of 
course, he insists that his actions are squarely within his constitutional power, pointing to a legal 
opinion that his lawyers wrote.   
While we might agree with the outcome when we share the same beliefs as a president 
who uses his position to achieve what we view as positive changes, are we really comfortable 
with a system where the only constitutional vetting that some executive action receives is from 
lawyers within the executive branch?  The answer to that question in this paper is a resounding 
no!  While there are myriad possible solutions to this issue, this paper takes the position that the 
most constitutionally sound and normatively superior solution is for the Court to liberalize 
congressional standing.  
The paper is broken into five sections.  Section one discusses separation of powers, 
focusing on both the intended and current structure of our government.  Section two discusses 
standing generally.  Section three discusses the current jurisprudence on congressional standing.  
Section four discusses the problems with congressional standing jurisprudence and why the 
Court should liberalize congressional standing.  Finally, section five discusses four possible 
formulations for congressional standing.  
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PREVENTION OF 
TYRANNY. 
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 “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”2  While the American 
government is by no means a government with absolute power, America’s federal government 
does have lots of power.
3
  If the aforementioned, and often quoted, maxim holds true, then given 
the extent of power in the federal government, Americans would be remiss to ignore the 
possibility of their own government acting in a manner not permitted by the Constitution.  
Luckily for Americans the federal government’s power is distributed across three branches.4  
However, the difficult issue is not in having sufficient distribution of power on paper, rather it is 
how to best ensure a sufficient distribution of power in fact.  The best answer, and the one that 
conforms with our founders’ intent to prevent tyranny, is to have a realistic and effective system 
of checks and balances to ensure an adequate separation of powers within our federal 
government. 
a. The text of the Constitution and intent of the founders make clear that the 
separation of powers required by the Constitution was to prevent the 
accumulation of powers by a single branch. 
The text of the Constitution does not specifically state that the powers within the federal 
government are to be divided among the several branches of the government;
5
 however, the 
Constitution does enumerate the powers delegated to the different branches of government.
6
     
                                                          
2
 Letter from Lord Acton to Archbishop Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/acton-
acton-creighton-correspondence#lf1524_label_010. 
3
 See Katie Johnson, 6 Reasons Why 60% of All Americans Now Think Government Has Too Much Power, 
Americans for Tax Reform (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.atr.org/reasons-percent-all-americans-government-power-
a7890. 
4
 U.S. Const. arts. I-III. 
5
 See U.S. Const. 
6
 Id. art. I, II, III. 
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The Constitution vests “all legislative Powers . . . in a Congress . . . consist[ing] of a Senate and 
House of Representatives,”7 vests “[t]he executive Power . . . in a President”8 and gives him veto 
power over congressional legislation,
9
 and vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United States . . . in 
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”10  Moreover, because “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people,” our federal government is one of enumerated and limited powers.11  Finally, because 
our government is one of limited powers where the separate branches necessarily have some 
degree of overlap, and because common sense tells us there must be realistic and effective ways 
to prevent branches of the federal government from exceeding their limited powers, the branches 
must have effective checks on each other to prevent the unconstitutional accumulation of power 
by a particular branch of government. 
 Although an examination of the Constitution’s text is key to determining what separation 
of powers was envisioned to be, it is useful to understand the context in which the Constitution 
was enacted, and specifically, the problems that America’s founding fathers wanted to prevent, 
to further elucidate what the original intent was in regard to separation of powers.
12
  The 
                                                          
7
 Id. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
8
 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
9
 Id. art. I, § 7. 
10
 Id. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
11
 Id. amend. X.  
12
 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-95 (2008) (The Court examined the constitutional text and 
used “the historical background of the Second Amendment” to confirm the meaning of the Second Amendment.).  
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foremost concern in the minds of the Constitution’s drafters was the prevention of tyranny.13  
Tyranny can mean the deprivation of a natural right, but the sense of the word that was most 
important to the founders was “[t]he accumulation of all powers — the legislative, executive, and 
judicial — in the same hands . . . [and] the severe and autocratic exercise of sovereign power . . . 
by breaking down the division and distribution of governmental powers.”14  Interestingly, the 
prevention of tyranny was competing with an interest in having a federal government that was 
strong enough to actually work.
15
  The drafters of the Constitution, having experienced both 
tyranny under English rule, and ineffective governance under the Articles of Confederation, had 
these competing demands at the forefront of their minds as they went about designing our 
government.
16
   
 The founders recognized that a strong federal government carried with it the risk of 
tyranny.
17
  So, the founders attempted to structure the government in a way that could best 
prevent tyranny from ruining America’s hard-fought gains.  First, while distinct from the concept 
of separation of powers, was the founder’s creation of a federal government with limited and 
defined powers.
18
  Second, and most importantly to this paper, was how the founders structured 
                                                          
13
 The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers. 
14
 Id. (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”); Tyranny, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014);   
15
 The Federalist No. 45. 
16
 See Id. at Nos. 45-48, 51. 
17
 See Id. at Nos. 45-46. 
18
 U.S. Const. amend. X; id. arts. I, II, and III; The Federalist Nos. 45, 46 (James Madison). 
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the federal government.
19
  The Constitution divided federal government’s power between the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
20
  The evil being targeted by dividing the 
government’s power was the accumulation of powers in a single branch.21  In fact, Madison said 
that “the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be 
separate and distinct.”22   
 An important consideration of the founders when deciding how to structure the American 
government was the recent history they lived through.
23
  The founders overcame tyrannical 
England and then had multiple states operating under the Articles of Confederation
24
.  These 
recent historical happenings informed the decisions made in writing the Constitution.
25
  One 
problem that many states encountered was “too great a mixture, and even an actual 
consolidation, of the different powers.”26  The founders realized, as demonstrated by multiple 
state constitutions that adhered to total separation only so far as claiming so in a stanza of their 
constitutions, that total separation among the departments would not be possible.
27
  So the 
                                                          
19
 The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison). 
20
 U.S. Const. arts. I, II, and III. 
21
 The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison). 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. at Nos. 45-48, 51. 
24
 See generally Roger A. Bruns, A More Perfect Union:  The Creation of the United States Constitution, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). 
25
 See e.g. The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) (examining “the constitutions of the several States” and the 
history of these states when discussing how power would be distributed in the new federal government). 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
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founders sought to prevent the evil of too much consolidation of powers.
28
  Based on recent 
experience with state government in early America, the founders thought the most likely culprit 
for accumulation of power would be the legislature.
29
  The problem, as the founders saw it, was 
that the legislature  nature accumulated power.
30
  Because absolute separation was impracticable, 
the founders attempted “to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the 
others.”31  So, while it is true that the founders placed emphasis on preventing the accumulation 
of power in the legislature specifically, the overarching concern was not too powerful of a 
legislature, rather the founders’ overarching concern was  the consolidation of too much power 
in any single branch.
32
 
b. Accumulation of powers has been and will continue to be a problem that must be 
effectively checked, no matter which branch is guilty. 
Well, the founders were right.  Their specific concern that the legislative branch would 
attempt to expand its power past what the Constitution allowed and legislate in ways that were 
unconstitutional has proven to be a valid concern on multiple occasions.  Congress tried to give 
itself the power to veto executive branch decisions outside of the legislative process in article I,
33
 
                                                          
28
 See Id. 
29
 Id. at No. 48. 
30
 Id. 
31 Id. 
32
 See Id. at No. 47 (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).  
33
 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934, 952-959 (1983) (the applicable law permitted one House of Congress to 
veto the Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation.  The Court explained “the action taken here by one 
House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative[,]” and because such action was conducted 
outside of the constitutionally mandated procedure of bicameralism and present, the legislative veto power in the 
law was unconstitutional). 
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Congress tried to retain control over the execution of the law by reserving removal power to 
itself
34
 and by giving a committee with members appointed by the legislative branch the power 
to execute the law,
35
 and Congress even tried to give the president the power to legislate.
36
  
However, the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s adherence to the Constitution effectively 
checked the legislature’s attempts to act in a manner that violated the Constitution.  These checks 
on legislative power were made possible because the founders knew that “‘there is no liberty, if 
the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’”37 
The founders were also wrong.  The founders were wrong in that they did not specifically 
expect that the executive branch would be where the majority of power consolidation would 
actually occur.
38
  The founders were wrong because many of their assumptions have not held 
true.
39
  Specifically, the founders never could have envisioned the size and scope of the 
executive branch as it exists today.
40
   
                                                          
34
 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (“[b]y placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in 
effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function.”).  
35 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-43 (1976) (holding “provisions of the Act, vesting in the Commission 
primary responsibility for conducting  civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights, 
violate Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Such functions may be discharged only by persons who are "Officers of 
the United States" within the language of that section.”). 
36
 See Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998) (holding the line item veto power given to president was 
unconstitutional because it gave the president the power to create law outside of the process required by the 
Constitution.). 
37
 The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (quoting Spirit of Laws. Vol. I, page 181). 
38 See Id. at No. 48 (noting the proclivity of the legislative branch to extend its power beyond those powers 
delineated to it in a written constitution). 
39
 See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725 (1996) (noting “[t]he 
dominance of the executive power” and that “‘congressional government,’ is long gone.”). 
40
 See generally id. (arguing the “inversion of the Founders' concern about the most dangerous branch . . . hardly 
registers in modern separation of powers thinking.”). 
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The founders’ assumption that the legislative branch would dominate was based, in part, 
on its exercise of legislating power.
41
  However, since the late 1930’s, with the rejection of the 
non-delegation doctrine,
42
 the executive branch exercises a great deal of legislative power.  Even 
more telling of which branch is prone to accumulating power is that the demise of the non-
delegation doctrine was itself prompted by President Roosevelt’s threat to pack the Supreme 
Court with justices who would do what he wanted.
43
  Well, President Roosevelt did not have to 
pack the Court because members of the Court responded by doing what the President wanted, 
notwithstanding the Court’s earlier opinions that rejected Congress’s power to constitutionally 
delegate its legislative power to the executive branch.
44
   
In fact, during the 112
th
 Congress (2011-2012) 7,515 regulations were passed by the 
executive branch
45
 while only 284 public laws were passed through bicameralism and 
presentment.
46
  The 2014 Code of Federal Regulations has more than 175,000 pages.
47
  Yes, an 
                                                          
41
 The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison). 
42
 This Day in History, Roosevelt announces “court-packing” plan, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan (last visited Apr. 06, 2016). 
43 See id. (“During the previous two years, the high court had struck down several key pieces of New Deal 
legislation on the grounds that the laws delegated an unconstitutional amount of authority to the executive branch 
and the federal government. Flushed with his landslide reelection in 1936, President Roosevelt issued a proposal in 
February 1937 to provide retirement at full pay for all members of the court over 70. If a justice refused to retire, an 
“assistant” with full voting rights was to be appointed, thus ensuring Roosevelt a liberal majority.”). 
44
 See id. (“In April, however, before the bill came to a vote in Congress, two Supreme Court justices came over to 
the liberal side and by a narrow majority upheld as constitutional the National Labor Relations Act and the Social 
Security Act.”). 
45
 Congressional Research Service, Counting Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal 
Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register 6 (July 14, 2015), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf. 
46
 Public Laws, 112
th
 Congress (2011-2012), https://www.congress.gov/public-laws/112th-congress (last visited 
Apr. 07, 2016); Private Laws, 112
th
 Congress (2011-2012), https://www.congress.gov/private-laws/112th-congress 
(last visited Apr. 07, 2016). 
47
 Federal Register & CFR Publication Statistics – Aggregated Charts, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/blog/learn/tutorials (last visited Apr. 07, 2016). 
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agency’s power to legislate is limited by “an intelligible principle,”48 and yes, Congress can 
influence the agencies or take the power away with enough support, but the bottom line is that 
the president, as head of the executive branch with numerous regulatory agencies, plays a 
pervasive role in making regulations that carry the force of law and greatly influence America.   
When one takes a step back and looks at how different our government is now than in 
1776, it is astonishing.  The federal government plays an extensive role in regulating minute 
aspects of our lives.
49
  The executive branch’s regulations typically affect the economy and our 
daily lives far more than the few general laws that Congress passes.
50
  Given this reality, and the 
founders overarching concern about consolidation of power, did the founders intend to create a 
government where the president could in some situations act in violation of the Constitution 
without anyone being able to tell this one man that he has violated the foundational law of our 
nation? 
Admittedly, the threats of today are very different than the threats faced by the 
founders.
51
  The founders were part of a budding nation that had only recently won its freedom.  
                                                          
48
 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
49
 E.g. 21 C.F.R. 1240.61 (banning people from selling raw milk in interstate commerce). 
50
 See generally Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal 
Regulatory State, Competitive Enterprise Institute (2015 Edition), available at 
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/10%2C000%20Commandments%202015%20-%2005-12-2015.pdf. (“If one 
assumed that all costs of federal regulation and intervention flowed all the way down to households, U.S. 
households would ‘pay’ $14,976 annually on average in regulatory hidden tax.”). 
51
 Compare The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison) (arguing a strong federal government was necessary to protect 
“the security of the people of America), with The World Bank, GDP Rankings (2014) available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table (The United States GDP was approximately 17.4 trillion 
dollars in 2014 and the next closest economy was China with 10.35 trillion dollars), and Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (the 
United States spent approximately 596 billion dollars on its military in 2015 and China only spent 214.8 billion 
dollars on its military in 2015). 
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Now America is a superpower.  America is a shining example of the great things that a diverse, 
educated populace with well instilled democratic values and a respect for the rule of law can 
accomplish.  However, as Thomas Jefferson recognized, although “[t]he tyranny of the 
legislatures is the most formidable dread at present . . ..  That of the executive will come in it’s 
[sic] turn, but it will be at a remote period.”52  Even if the remote period for tyranny of the 
executive branch has not yet come, the dangers inherent in the concentration of power in the 
executive branch should give America pause to consider more effective checks on the executive 
branch.  These checks will better ensure that the democratic values reflected in our Constitution 
are honored and having the checks will give citizens confidence that the rule of law is respected 
by the branch responsible for carrying out the law. 
c. What Powers do the Branches Have? 
 One of the most important things the founders did when writing the Constitution was to 
define the powers of the branches of government.  The concern of a tyrannical government was 
obviously present and the best solution to preventing this was to have a federal government of 
limited powers.
53
  Not only did the founders limit the power of the federal government in 
general, but they limited the powers of the separate branches by enumerating those powers in the 
text of the Constitution.
54
 
                                                          
52
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Mar. 15. 1789, available at 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib001586/. 
53
 See The Federalist Nos. 47-49, 51 (discussing the concern of a tyrannical government and how separating the 
powers among the branches would alleviate this concern). 
54
 See generally U.S. Const. 
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 Consistent with the founders’ view that the legislature naturally accumulated power, the 
founders spent the majority of the Constitution’s text clearly defining and limiting Congress’s 
power.
55
  First, the founders limited the areas in which Congress could pass laws by enumerating 
those areas and reserving un-enumerated powers to the states or the people themselves.
56
  The 
founders also included the “necessary and proper” clause because, while a federal government of 
limited powers was important to preventing tyranny, the founders had seen first-hand how too 
weak of a federal government was not a good thing.
57
 
 The executive power is vested in the president of the United States.
58
  The president is 
constitutionally required to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”59  In addition, the 
president has inherent authority because of his position.
60
  Executive power, and the inherent 
authority such power provides, are nebulous concepts.
61
  Making for further difficulty is that 
there is not much case law defining the powers of the president.
62
  We do however know that the 
                                                          
55
 Compare U.S. Const. art. I, with U.S. Const. arts. II-VII. 
56
 U.S. Const. art. I; id. amend. X. 
57
 Id. art. I; The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison). 
58
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
59
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
60
 William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, Boston 
University Law Review, Vol. 88:505. (noting the president’s “authority to act in times of national emergency [and] 
the right to keep advice from subordinates confidential). 
61
 Id. (the “overarching reason underlying the growth of the presidential power is that the constitutional text on the 
subject is notoriously unspecific.”). 
62
 See e.g. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (dismissing as a nonjusticiable political question whether or 
not the president had the power to unilaterally end a treaty). 
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executive branch cannot exercise pure legislative power,
63
 rather it can only legislate if Congress 
delegates the power and provides an intelligible principle.
64
 
The judicial branch’s power was created in Article III of the Constitution.65  The 
Constitution vests the judicial power in the branch, gives lifetime tenure and pay protection to 
the judges, and limits the jurisdiction of branch’s power.66  The jurisdiction of the power 
“extend[s] to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United 
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”67  This provision has 
been interpreted to mean that “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of 
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they 
have discretion. . . . [and to prevent the Court from answering] [q]uestions, in their nature 
political, or which are by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the executive.”68 
d.  Have the Branches’ Powers Been Effectively Checked? 
                                                          
63
 Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1998). 
64
 Compare A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42, 551 (1935) (holding 
Congress’s “attempted delegation of legislative power” that provided “no standards, aside from the statement of the 
general aims of rehabilitation” was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power), with  Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 
531 U.S. at 472-76 (holding statute that required the EPA to “establish uniform national standards at a level that is 
requisite to protect public health from the adverse effects of the pollutant in the ambient air” did was not an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). 
65
 U.S. Const. art. III. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. § 2. 
68
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). 
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The legislative branch’s power has been effectively checked by the executive and judicial 
branches
69
 and by itself because the highly partisan, two party American political system has 
caused an alliance based on party affiliation between the president and congressman within his 
same political party.
70
 The judicial branch’s power has been effectively checked by its naturally 
limited powers and self-imposed restraints.
71
  However, the executive branch’s power has not 
been effectively checked.  The executive branch’s exercise of power can be checked in a variety 
of ways, both by the judicial branch and the legislative branch.
72
  First, the judicial branch can 
check executive power if a case is brought before it by individuals,
73
 and this can be made easier 
based on how Congress drafts a statute.
74
  The individuals must, among other things, have been 
“injured in fact” by the executive branch’s exercise of power.75 Second, Congress has a variety 
                                                          
69
 See e.g. id. (holding “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, [was] void.”); see United States 
Senate, Summary of Bills Vetoed, 1789-present, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2016) (showing 
presidents have vetoed 2571 bills and only 110 vetoes were overridden). 
70
 See Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers (2006).  New York University 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers.  Paper 25. (“’[The] rise of the party system has made a significant 
extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power. . . . he heads a political system as well as a legal system.  
Party loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend his effective control into branches of 
government other than his own and he often may win, as a political leader, what he cannot command under the 
Constitution.’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J. 
concurring).  
71
 See e.g. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (explaining how the “case or controversy” requirements limit 
judicial power). 
72
 See generally Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, Forthcoming 58 William & Mary Law Review _ 
(2017). 
73 E.g. Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding the customs’ classification of 
imported items was not in accordance with applicable law). 
74
 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.”); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (holding Congress’s use of the “any party aggrieved” 
language indicated an “inten[t] to protect voters such as respondents from suffering the kind of injury here at issue,” 
being deprived of information relevant to voting, and that such injury was sufficiently concrete to constitute an 
“injury in fact.”).  
75
 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. 
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of tools that it can use in an effort to check the president’s exercise power:  Congress can cut 
funding; Congress can investigate, which alerts the public and can expose executive branch 
malfeasance; Congress can pass a new law, subject to the president’s veto power; and Congress 
can impeach the president.
76
  
The overall problem is that none of the aforementioned “checks” are enough to 
realistically and effectively keep the executive branch operating in accordance with the 
Constitution.  Specifically, under current standing jurisprudence, the judicial branch’s power is 
not capable of addressing all instances where the executive branch is violating the Constitution.
77
  
While Congress is not helpless, it has a variety of self-help remedies it can deploy in an attempt 
to end unconstitutional executive action, these tools do not always work.  Even in instances 
where Congress is able to convince the president to stop what Congress alleges are 
unconstitutional actions, Congress should not have to use its tools if the president is violating the 
Constitution.  Rather, Congress should only be required to resort to these tools when the 
president’s actions are constitutional.   
Here is an example of when none of the “checks” on the executive branch would work.  
Imagine the president himself believes that military intervention is necessary in some far off 
corner of the world; however, the majority, although not veto-proof majority, of congressmen 
disagree with him.  The president, having just begun his second term, faces little real political 
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accountability, so he decides now is the time for military intervention and orders the military to 
deploy half way across the globe to destroy the enemy.  The power to declare war is of course 
reserved to Congress.
78
  However, the president justifies his actions as being within his executive 
power because some attorneys who work for him wrote a short legal opinion saying his actions 
were constitutional, citing actions by past presidents to justify the opinion.
79
   
Yes, Congress could hold hearings on the matter and subpoena persons from the 
Department of Defense to testify, but realistically this would not accomplish anything because 
such a high profile action would already be known by the public.  Moreover, even if this was not 
a well-publicized action, a second term president is not very susceptible to democratic 
accountability since he cannot be reelected.  Yes, Congress could withhold future funds for the 
action, but Congress would then face the wrath of public opinion caused by the public’s 
righteous anger about funds being withheld from troops in battle.
80
  The president should not be 
able to shift the blame to Congress and distract the public debate away from his potential 
violation of the Constitution.  Further, even if Congress did fund the military campaign, doing so 
after the president unilaterally entered into a conflict would not necessarily satisfy the 
Constitution’s requirement that Congress declare war.81  Yes, Congress could in theory pass a 
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law prohibiting the president from continuing the military action.  However, even assuming that 
the president would not have his lawyers write a memo stating that the current use of military 
forces was solely within his discretion as Commander in Chief,
82
 given the realities of the 
legislative process (i.e. all the veto-gates) and the fact that in this scenario there is not a veto-
proof majority of Congressmen opposed to the president’s action, a law will not get passed.  
Finally, no individual would have a sufficient injury in fact to have standing to bring suit against 
the president.  Requiring Congress to exhaust all of its legislative remedies would not be 
practical, effective, what the founders intended, nor a normatively attractive solution to a 
potential constitutional violation by the president.   
In addition to this “hypothetical” situation, there are other instances, both ongoing and in 
the recent past, where the executive branch is or was 1) arguably acting in violation of the 
Constitution, and 2) the current “checks” either are proving or proved ineffective at stopping the 
alleged violation of the Constitution. by the executive branch.  President Bush authorized 
warrantless wiretapping of United States citizens’ telephone calls.83  President Bush deployed the 
military of the United States to Iraq and Afghanistan where it fought enemy forces without a 
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formal declaration of war.
84
  President Obama continued these conflicts without a formal 
declaration of war.  President Obama ordered military intervention in Libya
85
 and Syria.
86
  
President Obama issued executive orders on immigration, after having denied that he had the 
constitutional authority to reform immigration law on at least twenty-two prior occasions.
87
  
Finally, President Obama’s threatened actions regarding the closing of Guantanamo Bay and the 
moving of the terrorists who were imprisoned there in the face of consistent congressional 
insistence that the President not move those prisoners.
88
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If an individual brought suit for any one of the aforementioned actions he would likely 
lack a sufficient injury for them to have standing.
89
  It is easy to see why the judicial branch 
should not, and does not, want its role to be to solve such generalized grievances brought to it by 
individual citizens.  However, it should be different when Congress brings suit challenging the 
executive branch’s constitutional authority to do what it is doing.  Some of these examples come 
down to an issue of statutory interpretation, but the judicial branch still should decide such cases.  
If the executive branch is executing a statute contrary to what the law is, then the executive 
branch is acting unconstitutionally, either because the president is not “taking care” that the law 
be faithfully executed
90
 or because the executive branch is legislating.
91
 
The president and executive branch as a whole are capable of exercising power in a way 
that violates the Constitution.
92
  The fact that the president has in the past violated the 
Constitution is all the more reason to expect future presidents too will exceed their authority.  
The likelihood for future unconstitutional actions by presidents, if unchecked, is even greater for 
a variety of reasons, including presidents’ use of the classic “he did it, therefore so can I” defense 
in concert with “impartial” legal advice from lawyers that work under someone appointed by and 
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who can be removed by the president, to justify the constitutionality of their actions.
93
  The 
president also holds a great deal of power because Congress has delegated power to agencies 
allowing them to regulate most areas where federal law governs activities.
94
  Furthermore, 
because the legislative process is ridden with veto-gates and because regulatory schemes are so 
complex, it is difficult to imagine Congress regularly being able to override an agency action 
with the currently available tools, even if the agency action was unconstitutional.  Finally, the 
office of the president naturally has lots of discretion, whether it be in allocating scarce resources 
or in conducting foreign affairs.  The president is able to mobilize his massive resources to find a 
way to operate in the “loophole” created when individuals lack a sufficient injury to challenge 
executive actions, and accomplish what a court might otherwise determine was unconstitutional. 
The important question for this paper is not whether the executive branch should play as 
large of a role in creating law as it does, nor is it how much power is too much for the executive 
branch.  Rather, the important questions addressed in this paper are two-fold:  First, did the 
founders intend to allow such a great expansion in one branch’s power to go without realistic, 
effective checks on that power; second, even ignoring the founders’ intent, should our country 
have more realistic and effective checks and balances to prevent tyranny? 
II. Standing 
Why does the standing doctrine exist if the doctrine is not explicitly mentioned in the 
constitution?  Well, as we all know the Constitution is not explicit about much; however, we do 
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get some guidance from the text of the Constitution and the structure of government that it 
establishes.  As mentioned before, the Constitution states “[t]he judicial power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”95   
However, consistent with the Constitution’s conferral of limited powers to the legislative 
and executive branches, the judicial power only “extend[s] to all cases, in law and equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and . . . to controversies to which the 
United States shall be a party.”96  The “case or controversy” mandate, thus, is a prerequisite to 
Judiciary’s constitutional exercise of power, “stat[ing] fundamental limits on federal judicial 
power.”97  Standing is one of multiple “case or controversy” requirements, and it is likely the 
most important to limiting judicial power.
98
  To satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
standing, the plaintiff must show that 1) there is an injury in fact, 2) the injury is fairly traceable 
to the defendant’s actions, and 3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the relief requested.99  
The aforementioned requirements are not susceptible to “precise definitions,” and the standing 
analysis cannot be reduced to a mechanical exercise; however, because the standing requirement 
“is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers,” courts can try to further that 
underlying purpose without doing injury to the Constitution.
100
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To have standing, the plaintiff must first show an “injury in fact.”101  However, this 
requirement is not to be confused with success on the merits, because allegations by the plaintiff 
are construed as true to assess standing.
102
  The Court has held that “an asserted right to have the 
Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on 
a federal court.”103  While the injury must be “concrete and particularized,” the Court has shown 
a willingness to liberally construe this requirement to include even esthetic injury caused by 
government inaction.
104
  Second, the plaintiff must show the injury was caused by the 
defendant’s actions; the injury must be “fairly . . . traced to the challenged action of the 
defendant.”105  Third, the plaintiff must establish that the courts can redress asserted injury; to 
meet this requirement, the injury must be “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id., at 
38.  Finally, the plaintiff must fall within the zone of interests protected by the law.
106
 
III. Congressional Standing Jurisprudence 
 Generally, there is a whole lot of nothing when it comes to Supreme Court precedent on 
congressional standing.  This is especially true for claims based on an institutional injury.  In 
fact, until Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the only 
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time the Court recognized the standing of legislators claiming an institutional injury was in 
Coleman v. Miller in 1939.
107
 
 In Coleman, the Court recognized the standing of twenty state senators claiming an injury 
to the state senate as an institution.
108
  The twenty senators had voted against a resolution that the 
State of Kansas ratify a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution.
109
  Twenty 
senators had voted in favor of the resolution, and twenty senators had voted against the 
resolution.
110
  The Lieutenant Governor then cast a tie-breaking vote in favor of the resolution.
111
  
The Court said that the senators’ asserted injury, “maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,” 
was a right given to them under the United States Constitution.
112
  Next, because these votes 
“would have been decisive in defeating the ratifying resolution,”113 because without the 
Lieutenant Governor’s vote the resolution would not have passed, the Court found the twenty 
senators who had voted against the resolution had standing to allow for judicial review of the 
alleged institutional injury to the Kansas Senate.
114
  The Court, after giving standing, decided the 
case against the Senators on the merits.
115
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 Interestingly, the concurring opinion concluded that the senators lacked standing because 
the question that called for a decision was “political.”116  The concurring opinion emphasized 
that the Constitution gave “Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional 
amendments.”117  Thus, Congress’ proclamation that an amendment was ratified in accordance 
with the Constitution was binding on the Courts.
118
  The concurring members viewed the Court’s 
consideration of the issue as “judicial interference” into matters that were not subject to judicial 
review.
119
 
 In 1969, the Court gave standing to Congressman Adam Powell.  Congressman Powell 
was elected as a Congressman from New York, but pursuant to a House resolution Congressman 
Powell was excluded from taking his seat in Congress.
120
  Congressman Powell brought suit 
claiming his exclusion was in violation of the Constitution and deprived him of his seat in 
Congress and salary.
121
  The deprivation of the seat and salary was the injury-in-fact sufficient 
for purposes of standing, and was an assertion of an individual rather than an institutional injury 
by Congressman Powell.
122
  More interesting than the type of injury was the Court’s willingness 
to “interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document 
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by another branch.”123  Further the Court stated that “[t]he alleged conflict that such an 
adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their constitutional responsibility.”124 
 In 1997, the Court received a case from the D.C. Circuit.  The Federal District Court for 
the District of Columbia had held that the six members, who had served during the 104
th
 
Congress when the Line Item Veto Act passed, had standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the act.
125
  The members of congress bringing suit all voted “nay,” and they brought suit under a 
provision in the Act that allowed “any Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected. 
. . [to] bring an action for declaratory judgement and injunctive relief on the ground that any 
provision of this part violates the Constitution.”126  The congressmen asserted injuries to 
themselves in their capacity as congressmen because the Act effected the legal effect of their 
future votes, prevented them from exercising their role in repealing laws, and altered the balance 
of power between branches of government.
127
  All of these injuries, they asserted, violated 
Article I of the Constitution.
128
 
 The Court held the congressmen lacked standing.
129
  The court began by laying out the 
elements of standing and emphasizing standing’s “overriding and time-honored concern about 
keeping the judiciary’s power within its proper sphere.”130  First, the Court made clear that 
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Congress cannot give constitutional standing “to a plaintiff who would not otherwise having 
standing.”131  Next, the Court distinguished between precedent where there was standing and the 
present case.
132
  In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969), the Court held 
Congressman Powell had standing where his asserted injury was being excluded from the House 
of Representatives and the loss of salary from this exclusion.
133
  The key difference between 
Powell and the present case is that Congressman Powell’s injury was personal while the injury 
asserted by the six senators was an injury to institution.
134
  The Court continued by making 
various, further distinctions between Coleman and the current case.
135
  The crucial distinction 
between the present case and Coleman was that the senators who brought suit in Coleman had 
votes “sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative act” and the result of the alleged 
unconstitutional action was complete vote nullification.
136
  Whereas in the present case the 
congressmen’s votes, even though the bill was passed, were given full effect.137 
 Most recently, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, the Court held the Arizona Legislature had standing to bring suit challenging the 
constitutionality of a proposition that removed redistricting authority from the Arizona 
Legislature.
138
  Voters adopted a proposition in 2000 that amended Arizona’s Constitution in an 
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effort to end gerrymandering of political districts by the Arizona Legislature.
139
  After the 2012 
congressional districts were drafted by the independent commission, the Arizona Legislature 
brought suit “arguing that the AIRC and its map violated the ‘Elections Clause’ of the U.S. 
Constitution.”140  Key in the Court’s standing analysis was that Arizona’s Constitution bans the 
legislature from “undermin[ing] the purposes of an initiative.”141 Thus, the result of the 
proposition was an allegedly unconstitutional complete vote nullification.
142
    
 In reaching its decision that the Arizona Legislature had standing to bring suit, the Court 
compared the present case to both Raines and Coleman.  The Court distinguished from Raines on 
the basis of who was bringing suit.  As discussed previously, Raines involved six members of 
Congress who brought the suit individually while claiming an institutional injury.  The six 
individuals brought suit against the wishes of both the house and senate and the asserted injury 
impacted all members equally.  In the present case, the suit was brought by the Arizona 
legislature itself after approval in both chambers.  It was therefore the institution itself asserting 
an institutional injury.  The Court went on to analogize the present case to Coleman because in 
both cases there was complete vote nullification.  In the present case the Arizona Constitution 
prohibited the legislature “from undermin[ing] the purposes of an initiative,” thus if the act was 
constitutional, the Arizona Legislature could not itself take any action to overturn the proposition 
and was being denied its asserted constitutional right to participate in redistricting.  The effect of 
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not being able to, by itself, do anything to correct the alleged constitutional infringement, was 
complete vote nullification. 
 What can we take away from Supreme Court precedent on the issue of congressional 
standing?  First, the traditional standing analysis still applies.
143
  There must be an injury in fact, 
the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action, and must be redressable by a 
favorable ruling.
144
  Second, complete vote nullification is one example of an injury sufficient to 
justify institutional congressional standing.
145
  Third, individual congressmen cannot assert an 
institutional injury based on alleged injury that equally impacted all members of Congress.
146
  
Fourth, the Court is afraid of inserting itself into a position where it decides the meaning of the 
Constitution when the controversy is between the other two branches of the federal 
government.
147
  Finally, there are still a great deal of unanswered questions as to when Congress 
would have standing.  However, the Court, at least in words, has said it will not shy away from 
its constitutional duty of being the final arbiter of the Constitution’s meaning as applied to a co-
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equal branch of government’s actions in accordance with its own interpretation of the 
Constitution.
148
 
IV. Problems with Current Congressional Standing Jurisprudence  
 The first weakness of current congressional standing jurisprudence is the lack of it.  This 
is especially true when looking at standing in the context of the federal Congress.  Both Arizona 
and Coleman, the two cases approving legislative standing, concerned state legislatures.
149
  The 
Court has yet to answer whether the same standing analysis applies when dealing with questions 
of the federal legislature’s standing.  The problem is that the underlying concern of standing is 
separation of powers, which is not implicated when a federal court decides the powers of a state 
branch of government.  If a similar dispute to what arose in Coleman occurred, but it involved 
the federal legislature instead of a state legislature, the Court would, as a coequal branch of the 
federal government, be resolving a direct dispute between the two other coequal branches of the 
federal government, implicating the separation of powers concerns that are core reasons for the 
standing doctrine.   
 A second weakness, again stemming from the lack of Court cases, is the question of what 
situations, other than complete vote nullification, would the Court allow for congressional 
standing?  The Court has made two related things clear: first, the Court does not want to interfere 
with the other branches of government; and second, the Court wants to limit its own role in 
deciding controversies between the other branches.  However, would the Court consider playing 
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a more active role in ensuring our government acts in accordance with the Constitution if a set of 
facts showed a clear constitutional violation by the executive branch? 
 Finally, the question of whether the current lack of a remedy to right a wrong will be 
addressed by the courts remains unanswered.  Because the Court has refused to take up more 
cases on the issue we have potentially unconstitutional actions that have no practical remedy.  It 
is understandable that the Court does not want individual citizens who lack a concrete injury to 
be able to petition the courts to decide whether the government is acting in accordance with the 
constitution, but it is a completely different situation when a coequal branch of government 
claims that another branch is not abiding by the Constitution.  The Court does not want to 
overstep its own constitutional authority, and this is clearly a laudable goal, but by liberalizing 
congressional standing the Court would not be self-aggrandizing.  Rather, because the judiciary’s 
constitutional role is “to say what the law is,” and because the “courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by [the Constitution],” the Court would only be fulfilling what was 
intended to and should be its role.
150
  For “[t]o what purpose are powers limited, and to what 
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by 
those intended to be restrained?”151   
Moreover, the Court has not shied away from its role deciding cases that require it to 
interpret the Constitution and review a coequal branch’s compliance with its requirements.  The 
Court has said that a suit “arises under” the Constitution if a petitioner’s claim” will be sustained 
if the Constitution . . . [is] given one construction and will be defeated if [it is] given another.”152  
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All that congressional standing would do is more clearly delineate the constitutional powers of 
the executive branch and close a gap to allow better enforcement of constitutional constraints on 
executive power. 
The Court must take seriously its role in saying “what the law is.”  If the Court does not 
embrace congressional standing, then the American public will lack confidence in its 
government because citizens will fear the tyranny that could result from a lack of a realistic and 
effective checks against unconstitutional executive actions.  The founders knew that Congress 
could not police itself and would try to expand its powers, and the checks and balances in general 
and the role taken by the Court specifically have effectively checked Congress’s unconstitutional 
actions.  The Court too has checked the executive branch for unconstitutional actions,
153
 but the 
Court, through self-imposed, as opposed to constitutionally mandated constraints, has limited its 
role in preventing constitutional violations that likely have and will continue to occur.  These 
potential constitutional violations are much more dangerous to our Country than smaller 
constitutional violations by the legislative branch that the Court has rightfully stepped in to end.  
The constitutional infringements that are going unchecked are that of a branch of the federal 
government being controlled by one person who at times has, and others in the future will likely 
continue to, aggrandized his power.  This can be an especially big problem for a president who 
begins his second term because the power of political accountability as to someone who never 
has to seek re-election is significantly lessened.
154
  Yes, the president still has some 
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accountability based on party obligations, because the party to which the president belongs wants 
to have members elected to office, and based on needing Congress to accomplish his objectives.  
However, a lot can be accomplished by a determined president especially when democratic 
accountability is lessened, and once things have been accomplished they can be difficult, if not 
impossible, to undo even if they were done in violation of the Constitution.   
Current congressional standing jurisprudence does not effectively address these 
problems.  The Court has not utterly failed in its role in checking the executive branch.  Most of 
the time actions by the executive branch affect some regulated entity in a manner that “injures” it 
sufficient to give standing.  So why do we need congressional standing?  We need congressional 
standing because there are instances where no private parties have standing to challenge 
executive action.  Two areas that are prime for congressional standing would be for 1) injuries to 
the public treasury caused by executive branch spending that is contrary to law,
155
 and 2) 
executive branch non-enforcement.
156
  Additional justiciability problems created by the political 
question doctrine
157
 and the presumption of unreviewability in non-enforcement cases
158
 would 
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likely temper the number of cases that courts actually decided, but these concepts should be 
further examined by the Court, and where the executive branch is violating the Constitution, they 
should not apply.
159
  However, even if there are few instances where Congress would prevail in 
these suits, public confidence in the federal government would be better because the decision as 
to whether or not the executive branch actually had legal authority for its actions would be 
answered by a neutral entity, which under the Constitution is the judicial branch.   
 
V. Proposals for Congressional Standing 
There are obviously many possible formulations for congressional standing.  Contained 
herein are a few formulations of congressional standing, a veritable menu from which the Court 
could choose to implement one or more variations with or without additional adjustments.  The 
underlying goal that the Court should pursue in choosing which situations merit congressional 
standing should be ensuring our Constitution is honored.   
There are many concerns that have led the Court and scholars to encourage continued 
adherence to the status quo, which is virtually nonexistent congressional standing.
160
  The 
underlying concern of those opposed to congressional standing is the proper role of the judicial 
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branch.
161
  Some view the proper role of the judicial branch as only deciding cases affecting 
private rights.
162
  This concern is further reflected in the political question doctrine that would 
apply quite often to cases involving disputes between branches of the federal government.
163
   
The answer to these concerns is the reason why increased congressional standing is 
necessary − to ensure that the Constitution is honored.  The Constitution being honored requires 
a federal government of limited powers and this includes limited powers for the branches 
enforced by effective checks on their exercise of power to keep it within its constitutional limits.  
Admittedly, individual liberties can often be protected by plaintiffs who are injured in fact by 
government action because of the broad right of legal review offered by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.
164
  Nonetheless, because constitutional violations are not redressable in all 
instances, the risks of tyranny inherent in a single branch of the federal government 
accumulating too much power demand an additional way to redress them.  We as a nation suffer 
a collective injury, but more importantly for the issue of standing, Congress as an institution 
suffers a concrete injury as a co-equal branch of government when the executive branch violates 
the Constitution either by failing to “take care” that the laws be faithfully executed or by 
exceeding its constitutional power.  
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Some scholars argue that congressional standing is not in line with the founders’ intent 
and that it is normatively unappealing.  The arguments are for the most part two-fold: first, that 
the founders’ overarching concern was with too powerful of a legislature and congressional 
standing gives Congress more power over the executive branch, the result of which is 
congressional aggrandizement
165
; second, that Congress already has the tools necessary to check 
executive power and allowing it to forego using these tools results in judicial aggrandizement 
and is normatively bad.
166
  These arguments have little merit.   
Even in cases where Congress prevails in its suit, congressional aggrandizement does not 
occur.  Congress “gains” power only so far as it maintains its current powers and the executive 
branch is preventing from exceeding its power under the Constitution.  Surely it would be 
ridiculous to think that ensuring the executive branch follows the Constitution is not something 
that our founding fathers wanted or that we as a nation want today.  While the balance of power 
would be different, it would only be different so far as the Constitution mandates that balance of 
power. 
Yes, Congress has tools to check executive power.  But insisting on exhaustion of 
legislative remedies by Congress before such a suit can progress is ludicrous.  The closest thing I 
can compare such a requirement to would be insisting that a doctor use a chain saw to perform 
surgery on someone’s ankle because they have one in their office.  While the doctor could cut off 
the person’s ankle and that ankle would no longer give the patient any issues, it would obviously 
be much better if the doctor could use a scalpel to address the precise problem.  Similarly, 
Congress has the power of the purse and the power to pass new laws.  However, as a recent 
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budget standoff showed,
167
 because of the interconnectedness of the federal government, unless 
Congress is willing to cause serious and unrelated collateral damage, like putting the national 
security of the United States at risk, there is not much it can do to stop a president’s alleged 
violation of the Constitution.  Further, in the example just mentioned Congress did not have a 
veto-proof majority,
168
 so Congress could not have passed a new law to stop President Obama’s 
alleged violation of the Constitution because President Obama surely would have exercised his 
veto power to shield his executive action.  Congress has blunt instruments in its power of the 
purse and ability to pass new laws, but congressional standing would give Congress a “scalpel” 
to, under limited circumstances and only where the executive branch violates the Constitution, 
allow the judicial branch to prevent the trampling of the Constitution.  This results in a 
government that is more in tune with the founders’ intent and normatively superior than our 
Country without such a mechanism.  For every legal wrong, there must be a remedy.  In this 
case, if the president chooses to act in violation of the Constitution, Congress should have the 
right to resort to the courts to enjoin his unconstitutional actions. 
a. Solution #1: 
First, and uncontroversially, an individual Congressman should be able to bring suit for 
an injury suffered by him in his official capacity if the facts conform with the ordinary standing 
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requirements.  This is the factual situation already approved by the Court in Powell v. 
McCormack.
169
  This is the least controversial form of congressional standing, and could 
arguably not fall under the rubric of congressional standing, but would likely be approved by 
today’s Court. 
b. Solution #2: 
Second, the Court could allow individual congressmen to assert institutional injuries 
when the asserted injury is complete vote nullification.  While prudential standing is likely a 
thing of the past,
170
 the concept should be applied to the issue of congressional standing.  The 
Constitution speaks in terms of the separate branches of government, and therefore, in general, is 
not designed to protect individual congressmen.  Thus, a congressman, in terms of his position as 
a congressman, would not generally be in the zone of interests protected by the Constitution, and 
could not assert an institutional injury.  While such a congressman would not have standing for a 
general assertion that the executive branch is violating the Constitution, there is a stronger case 
for this type of congressional standing when the asserted injury is complete vote nullification.  
An example of complete vote nullification, ignoring the merits of the claim, would be if the 
president appointed a federal judge without the advice and consent of the Senate.  Federal judges 
of course have lifetime tenure and the Senate has the constitutional role of approving federal 
judges.  Because there would not be any legislative recourse for a Senator, and because the 
Senator never had the chance the vote in the first place, he or she could then assert a 
constitutional injury to the institution of the Senate on its behalf.  This type of standing would be 
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limited to areas where Congress has an enumerated role and the effect of executive action is to 
completely remove Congress from the process. 
c. Solution #3: 
Third, the Court could allow the House or Senate as an individual body to bring suit to 
assert an institutional injury, but only if it is unlikely that any individual would have standing to 
bring suit.  Additionally, the House or Senate, when acting alone, could only bring suit when the 
asserted injury was to one of that body’s institutional interests enumerated in the Constitution.171 
Limiting suits brought by an individual house to instances when that house has an institutional 
interest enumerated in the Constitution is important for two reasons, one being based on the 
Constitution, and the other being based on the normative appeal of applying the limitation.  First, 
because the Constitution enumerated institutional interests, when one of those interests is 
asserted to have been violated by the executive branch, that house has allegedly suffered an 
injury that falls within the zone of interests protected by the Constitution.
172
  Second, limiting the 
instances where suit can be unilaterally brought by a house of Congress will decrease the number 
of situations where this power has the potential of being abused.  As mentioned before, the 
concepts of the now defunct prudential standing should apply as a limiting mechanism on when 
and how congressional standing can be employed.  The same prudential standing issues that were 
present for individual Congressman and Senators are present if the House or Senate does not 
have a constitutionally enumerated role in a particular issue.  So, if the constitutional question or 
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statutory interpretation at issue did not involve a constitutionally enumerated role in that area for 
the body attempting to bring suit on its own, then that body would lack standing.  Thus, under 
this analysis the House would generally have standing to challenge executive actions involving 
taxation if it was unlikely that any individual would have standing to bring suit.  The House 
would have standing in these instances because the alleged injury, the executive’s failure to “take 
care” or its legislating in the arena of raising revenue, would be to the House’s enumerated roll in 
originating bills that raise revenue.
173
  In this instance, the House would be able to bring suit 
without securing approval by the Senate.  Giving standing to the House would not mean success 
on the merits and a court could very easily find that the billions of dollars spent did not involve 
the spending of unappropriated funds or that the spending was the proper exercise of executive 
power under the Constitution, but at least the executive branch could be stopped from its actions 
if it indeed was violating the Constitution. 
d. Solution #4: 
Fourth, the Court could allow Congress to bring suit to assert an institutional injury based 
on alleged unconstitutional act by the executive branch caused by exceeding its own 
constitutional power or by failing “to take care” that the laws be faithfully executed, but only if it 
is unlikely that any individual would have standing to bring suit.  This formulation of 
congressional standing presents no problems with the prudential standing analysis that should 
apply to determining congressional standing.  Congress, as a body, is a coequal branch of 
government with specific enumerated powers and the exclusive power to originate laws, declare 
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war…. etc.174 It is intuitive, given the enumerated powers therein, that Congress’s institutional 
interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the Constitution’s conferral of limited 
powers to the separate branches of government.  There are many different possibilities for how a 
suit would be approved and the House and Senate could develop their own rules for approving 
suits or the Court could define the steps necessary to give congressional standing.   
My recommendation, and the one that adheres most closely to ensuring the Constitution 
is followed, is to eliminate the traditional veto-gates that are present during the normal legislative 
process.  Veto-gates, while more important to encouraging debate and promoting compromises 
are not as important when determining whether a suit to challenge executive branch actions 
should be undertaken.  When Congress is deciding whether or not to pass a law, Congress is the 
body making a decision and should do so only after a reasoned analysis of the pertinent facts and 
a vigorous debate of the applicable policy considerations.  In contrast, when Congress is deciding 
whether or not to bring a suit challenging the constitutionality of an executive branch action, 
Congress is only deciding if it wants the judicial branch to make a decision based on an analysis 
of the pertinent facts and applicable law.  Thus, only a limited duration for debate accompanied 
by a yea or nay vote in both the House and Senate should be undertaken prior to bringing suit.  
After approval in both the House and the Senate, the suit would go forward asserting an 
institutional injury.  Such a system would lessen the risk of the judiciary being flooded with 
cases because Congress has limited time.  In addition to the aforementioned safeguard to prevent 
Congress from bringing frivolous lawsuits, our form of government also serves as a safeguard to 
prevent congressional standing from being used as a tool to unjustifiably harass the executive 
branch.  The congressmen approving any suit against the president must, every few years, win an 
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election to continue in office.  If the public generally agrees with what the President is doing and 
Congress brings numerous lawsuits attempting to stop the executive, even if the lawsuits had 
merit, would be viewed as trying to interfere with the will of the people.  Thus, if public choice 
theory
175
 holds any merit, then it is unlikely that a majority of congressmen would be willing to 
bring a flood of frivolous lawsuits against the President unless such actions were the will of the 
people because the congressmen would be doing so at the potential cost of their place in office.   
While traditional laws must go through both bicameralism and presentment, presentment 
should not be required for instituting a suit against the executive branch.  All that presentment 
would do is to potentially give the president the power to continue to act unconstitutionally by 
exercising his veto power to insulate the executive branch from suit.  This absurd outcome would 
occur in cases where there was not a veto-proof majority. Further, because Congress is not 
legislating, Congress should not be required to go through the constitutionally mandated process 
for legislating, rather the legislative branch itself is just asserting an injury based on the 
executive branch’s violation of the Constitution. 
e. Conclusion 
 Admittedly, none of these proposals are uncontroversial.  As can be gleamed from the 
summary of law on congressional standing, the Supreme Court has not paid a great deal of 
attention to the idea of giving Congress standing.  Moreover, the Court is likely to show 
continued hostility to embracing the role or arbitrating disputes between the legislative and 
executive branches of the federal government, and articulating limits to executive power.  
However, given the founders’ intent and the normative appeal of a federal government where 
                                                          
175
 See generally P.J. Hill, Public Choice: A Review, 34 Faith & Economics 1 (1999) (“collective action is modeled 
with individual decision-makers using the political process to further their self-interests.”). 
Comment [MS2]: This seems naive.  The 
party out of the White House always wants to 
harass the Executive and will do so with 
lawsuits if they control Congress.  The Burwell 
case is a good example.  The House authorized 
the lawyers to bring any and all claims 
concerning the ACA.  They hadn't even 
developed their appropriation theory yet. 
42 
 
each branch is actually, effectively prevented from acting in violation of the Constitution, the 
Court should adopt, when a case with appropriate facts presents itself, one or more of the four 
proposals for congressional standing. 
